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Abstract 
 
 Energy and environmental concerns have motivated policymakers to support renewable energy 
technology development through various tax policies. Currently, the majority of renewable energy projects in 
the U.S. benefit from tax credit incentives. The associated tax equity financing structure has received criticism 
for its inefficient use of taxpayer resources relative to other policies, including the Section 1603 Cash Grant. 
The cash grant provided renewable energy developers with the option to receive a cash injection in lieu of the 
prevailing tax credit during 2009 to 2011.  
 
 Conversely, renewable energy developers have begun to form dividend-oriented investment vehicles 
that house renewable energy assets with long-term power purchase agreements in a manner that parallels the 
master limited partnership (MLP) for conventional oil and gas companies. The relatively recent structure, 
known as a YieldCo, has lowered financing costs while providing renewable developers with access to an 
alternate investor base with a more competitive source of capital.  
 
 Through the contribution of a proprietary framework for evaluating the financial impact of various 
public policies, this thesis seeks to evaluate the relative cost effectiveness of cash grants, tax credits and pass-
through tax structures (MLPs and YieldCos) in achieving government policy objectives. The financial model 
helps determine how efficient each policy is in furthering renewable energy development for each dollar in 
government tax expenditures. The analysis is supported by a sensitivity analysis of the parameters of the 
financial model.  
 
 Although the financial model corroborated existing literature with regards to cash grants being 
approximately twice as efficient as tax credit incentives, the financial analysis ultimately found pass-through 
structures to be the most efficient policy solution for furthering renewable energy growth. The ancillary benefits 
of the pass-through structure, including enhanced liquidity and borrowing cost improvements, propel the 
business structure ahead of the other policy options in terms of their efficient use of taxpayer resources. 
Government policy should support pass-through structures, either by facilitating market environments that 
accommodate YieldCo growth or by legislating the widespread introduction of the MLP structure to the 
renewable energy industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
3 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract                       2 
 
1. Introduction                         4 
 
2. Renewable Energy Policy Landscape                  7 
2.1 Motivation for Renewable Energy Policy                                                                                                          7 
2.2 Overview of Current Renewable Energy Policies                   7 
 
3. Relative Effectiveness of Cash Grants and Tax Credits in Driving Renewable Growth        10 
3.1 Regulatory Risks Associated with Cash Grants and Tax Credits Inhibit Sustained Development           10 
3.2 Tax Credits Facilitate Tax Equity Capital Structures and Elevate Financing Costs                                   10 
 
4. Pass-Through Structures: Master Limited Partnership Overview                                                     13 
4.1 History of Master Limited Partnerships                                                                                                   13 
4.2 The MLP Parity Act (MLPPA)                                                                                                               14 
4.3 Incentive Distribution Rights Align General Partner Compensation with Limited Partner Interest         14 
4.4 MLP Structure Has a Strong, Proven Track Record Within the Energy Sector                                     15 
 
5. Pass-Through Structures: YieldCo Overview                                                                             16 
5.1 Yield Companies (YieldCo or ‘Synthetic MLP’)                                                                                              16 
5.2 Incentives for Forming a YieldCo                                                                                                                    17 
5.3 Risks to YieldCo Investors                                                                                                                               17 
 
6. Financial Analysis: Methodology                                                                                                     18 
6.1 Financial Model Assumptions Based on Solar Comparable Companies Analysis                                          18 
6.2 Independent Variable: Income Generation and EBITDA Levels                                                                    19 
6.3 Dependent Variable: Effects of Policy Scenarios on Cash Flow, Financing Costs and Tax Provisions        20 
6.4 Key Metric: ΔBaseCase Free Cash Flow / ΔBaseCase Tax Revenue Loss                                                                23 
 
7. Financial Analysis: Results                                                                                                                 24 
7.1 Summary of Results by Policy Scenarios                                                                                                         24 
7.2 Pass-Through Structures (MLPs and YieldCos) Most Efficiently Deploy Taxpayer Resources                     26 
 
8. Sensitivity Analysis and Limitations of Analysis                                                                              27 
8.1 Implications of Sensitivity Analysis: Importance of Unlocking a Lower Cost of Capital                               27 
8.2 Limitations of Analysis                                                                                                                                    28 
 
9. Conclusion: Policy Recommendations                                                                                          30 
9.1 Government Policy Should Favor Cash Grants in Lieu of Tax Credit Incentive                                            30 
9.2 Government Policy Should Support Accommodating Market Environment for YieldCos                              30 
9.3 The Widespread Introduction of MLPs to the Renewable Energy Industry                                                    31 
 
Appendix                                                                                                                                                   33 
 
Glossary                                                                                                                                                  42 
 
References                                                                                                                                                      44 
 
	  
4 
1. Introduction  
   
Energy plays an essential role in contemporary society, supporting systems that meet vital human needs 
such as shelter, sustenance, transportation and employment. Although the U.S. populace accounts for less than 5 
percent of the global population, the nation consumes 19 percent of the world’s energy (9.5 percent of which 
comes from renewable energy sources).1 The U.S.’s heavy reliance on fossil fuels, primarily imported 
petroleum products, present energy security concerns, while greenhouse gas emissions associated with the 
production and consumption of conventional energy progressively heighten the effects of global climate change.  
 Renewable energy cost curves have improved dramatically, but financing challenges and the inherent 
capital-intensive nature of renewable projects have continued to hinder the competitive growth of the industry. 
Accordingly, federal programs have been implemented to further the development of the sector by helping 
renewable energy projects overcome financing hurdles. The predominant public policies intended to drive clean 
energy growth include tax credits, cash grants, loan guarantees and renewable portfolio standards at the state-
level.  
In recent years, most renewable projects in the U.S. have benefitted from tax equity investments. Tax 
equity investors are generally large investment banks and insurance companies who partner with project 
developers to capitalize on federal tax credits for renewable technologies. Since renewable projects generally 
lack the sufficient tax liabilities necessary to enjoy the full benefit of a tax credit, developers are often forced to 
enter highly specialized and costly tax equity financing structures.  Following the global financial crisis in 2008, 
the tax equity market decelerated and renewable energy development slowed. In recognition of the fact that tax-
based policy incentives are ineffective when tax burdens are low, Congress instituted the option to receive an 
equivalent cash grant in lieu of the prevailing investment tax credit incentive in The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA 2009).2 When renewable energy companies and research reports deemed the 
cash grant to be a more effective use of taxpayer resources relative to a tax credit, policymakers began 
reevaluating current policies in search of a more effective policy mechanism for the renewable energy sector.  
While prevailing tax policies for the renewable energy industry traditionally focus on production or 
investment measures, pass-through tax structures derive their tax benefit from corporate structure, which in turn 
reduces costs of capital. The cost of capital, which includes both the cost of equity and the cost of the debt, is 
the return investors require to ensure that a capital-budgeting project is worthwhile. The main pass-through 
structure within the broader energy industry is the master limited partnership (MLP). An MLP is a business 
structure that benefits from avoiding the corporate level taxation of a C-corporation, and whose ownership 
interest units are traded as securities in financial markets, like corporate stock. Currently, a partnership must 
derive 90 percent of its income from qualifying sources, including commodities, conventional energy sources 
and other depletable resources.3 Renewable projects do not legally qualify for the MLP corporate structure, 
while traditional oil and gas competitors have been benefiting from the preferential tax treatment coupled with 
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the liquidity of a publicly traded company for decades. The MLP Parity Act would provide the renewable 
energy industry with the same advantageous tax status and with access to a larger pool of investors.  
As the industry continues to mature, the market appetite for renewable investments continues to rise. 
Accordingly, a handful of large renewable energy developers have begun to form Yield Companies (YieldCo), 
an alternate pass-through structure known as ‘synthetic MLPs.’ Like MLPs, YieldCos also generate power 
under long-term purchase agreements and distribute much of their cash flow to shareholders. The rise of the 
YieldCo has further validated the pass-through structure and has incentivized developers to create yield-
oriented investment vehicles by offering exposure to an alternative investor pool with a more competitive 
source of equity capital. 
This thesis seeks to analyze the relative 
effectiveness of cash grants, tax credits and pass-through 
tax structures in supporting renewable energy 
development through a financial model based on a 
comparable companies analysis of leading solar 
developers. The proprietary financial model contributes a 
framework for policymakers to evaluate the relative 
financial impacts of public policies supporting renewable 
energy development. The policies were evaluated on their 
relative efficiencies in directly converting government 
tax expenditures into incremental free cash flow for a 
hypothetical solar energy company. Key findings are 
shown in the aside Table 1.  
 
The aforementioned solar company model determined that pass-through structures (MLPs / YieldCos) 
are the most efficient, followed by cash grants, then tax credits. In other words, each $1 in tax revenue loss for 
the government resulted in a direct $1.25 increase to the company’s free cash flow when operating under the 
pass-through structure, $0.89 for cash grants, but only $0.44 for tax credits. The ancillary benefits associated 
with the pass-through structure, including a lower cost of capital and enhanced liquidity, ultimately position the 
structure as a more effective policy for advancing renewable energy growth relative to a cash grant or a tax 
credit. These results are accompanied by a sensitivity analysis, which further emphasizes the importance of 
costs of capital; the policies are able to unlock incremental benefits that exceed the tax revenue loss when 
lowering renewable energy companies’ costs of capital. 
From the government’s perspective, the pass-through structure is a more efficient use of taxpayer 
resources relative to the prevailing cash grant and tax credit policies. In the current policy landscape, the 
YieldCo is the most efficient compromise between government objectives and private-sector renewable energy 
 ($ in millions) Base Case Cash Grant Tax Credit
Net Present Value (NPV) of 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 326.0        365.9         345.7          374.5           
8% Discount Rate
ΔNPV of FCF Relative to 
Base Case -           39.9          19.7           48.4            
% Growth 12% 6% 15%
Weighted Average Cost of 
Debt and Tax Equity 5.0% 5.0% 6.4% 4.0%
Net Present Value (NPV) of 
Tax Revenue Loss -              44.6          44.6           38.7            
3% Discount Rate
ΔNPV of Tax Revenue 
Loss Relative to Base Case -              44.6          44.6           38.7            
a
Effective Tax Rate (35%) (35%) (35%) 0%
Tax Credit Benefit
As a % of Capital Expenditures
Δ(Base) NPV of FCF / Δ(Base) 
NPV of Tax Revenue Loss
Table 1: Key Findings
A measure of the cash flow 
benefit to the company 
relative to the tax revenue 
loss for the government
-              89% 44% 125%
-              -                 
30% of 
expenditures 
until 2016, 10% 
thereafter
30% of 
expenditures until 
2016, 10% 
thereafter
Pass-Through 
Tax Status
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growth. Accordingly, policymakers should further encourage renewable developers to benefit from pass-
through structures, either through supporting YieldCos or by passing the MLP Parity Act.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
7 
2. Renewable Energy Policy Landscape 
  
2.1 Motivation for Renewable Energy Public Policy 
Throughout much of American history, commerce and industrial energy needs were met entirely from 
domestic reserves, as the United States contains an abundant supply of natural resources. However, a robust, 
growing economy fueled by rapid industrialization and population growth eventually fostered the need to enlist 
foreign energy sources to supplement domestic supplies.4 The implications of such dependence on foreign 
energy importation, coupled with price volatility concerns driven by supply fluctuations, have underpinned the 
importance of reliable energy sources in U.S. public policy discourse.  
Since the 1970s, U.S. energy tax policy has sought to achieve two broad objectives. First, policymakers 
have attempted to reduce dependence on oil imports by enhancing domestic energy investments and production 
tax subsidies.28 Second, environmental concerns have resulted in tax code benefits for a variety of renewable 
and energy efficiency technologies. The Obama Administration has since continued to stress the importance of 
investments in renewable energy projects and infrastructure. As President Obama noted in his 2011 State of the 
Union Address, clean energy investments can strengthen domestic energy security, facilitate job creation and 
support environmental goals.5 Yet, the U.S. currently remains heavily reliant on fossil fuel energy sources. In 
2011, approximately 48 percent of electricity was produced from coal-burning power plants.4 
 
2.2 Overview of Current Renewable Energy Policies 
Federal programs have been implemented to help capital-intensive renewable energy projects overcome 
financing hurdles and further the development of the industry. The primary, federal policy mechanisms 
encompass tax incentives and cash grants. Recent public policies that offer direct or indirect forms of financial 
support to promote the large-scale commercialization of renewable energy technologies include:  
 
(1) Investment Tax Credit (ITC),  
(2) Section 1603 Cash Grant,  
(3) Production Tax Credit (PTC),  
(4) Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program and  
(5) Renewable Portfolio Standards (State-Level Policy) 
 
 
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) 
Although the ITC was first legislated to increase production of oil and natural gas, the oil embargo of 
1973 and the Iranian Revolution ultimately led to a policy shift towards conservation and alternative energy. As 
a result, the Energy Tax Act of 1978 first established ITCs for renewable energy.9 The current ITC is available 
to a variety of renewable energy technologies (including solar, fuel cells, small wind turbines, geothermal 
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systems, micro-turbines and combined heat and power), from now through December 31, 2016.9 For solar 
projects, the ITC is equal to 30 percent of total expenditures, with no maximum credit limit, but the credit 
amount is expected to step down to 10 percent of expenditures in 2017. Contrary to the PTC, the ITC is not 
linked to the actual generative performance of the project, but rather is derived from capital investments in 
property and equipment. The JCT estimates that the ITC will generate $2.3 billion in tax revenue losses over the 
2011 to 2015 budget window, nearly all of which is due to solar technology investments.10 The ITC has been 
criticized for its inefficient use of taxpayer resources; the consequential tax equity financing structure often 
prevents government tax expenditures from directly achieving its goal of driving renewable energy growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 1603 Cash Grant  
 Following the global financial crisis in 2008, tax equity investors were facing liquidity constraints, as 
both the tax equity market and renewable energy development slowed. In order to fill the investment gap in 
renewable energy markets, Congress established the Section 1603 Cash Grant in the ARRA 2009.2 The Section 
1603 Cash Grant, which was authorized between 2009 and 2011, offered eligible renewable energy developers 
with a cash grant equivalent to 30 percent of a project’s total eligible cost basis in place of the traditional ITC 
incentive.11 During its tenure, the Section 1603 program funded $21.6 billion to over 95,000 projects, while 
installing 29.6 GW in new electricity capacity.11  
 
Production Tax Credit (PTC) 
 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 established the Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC) as a 
primary federal incentive for renewables. Although solar thermal is a qualifying technology under the PTC, the 
policy has generally targeted wind energy projects in practice.6 The PTC is a per-kilowatt-hour tax credit 
received by qualifying energy technologies for electricity generation. Therefore, the benefit of the PTC is 
directly linked with project performance. In addition to wind technologies, the federal tax credit was extended 
to also include biomass, geothermal, landfill gas, municipal solid waste, qualifying hydroelectric, and marine 
Resource Type In Service Deadline Credit Amount
Solar December 31, 2016
Fuel Cells December 31, 2016
Small Wind Turbines December 31, 2016
Geothermal Systems December 31, 2016
Microturbines December 31, 2016
Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP) December 31, 2016
Source: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
10% of expenditures
10% of expenditures
Table 2: Business Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC)
30% of expenditures
30% of expenditures
30% of expenditures
10% of expenditures
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and hydrokinetic power generation.6 Prior to the PTC’s construction deadline on December 31, 2013, wind 
projects received a 2.3¢ per-kilowatt-hour credit. Including the current lapse, the PTC has expired four times 
during the past 15 years, leading to subsequent boom-and-bust investment cycles in wind energy.7  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Energy (DOE) Loan Guarantee Program  
 Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorizes the DOE to provide support for innovative clean 
energy technologies through loan guarantees.12 In a loan guarantee agreement, the federal government pledges 
to cover the full debt obligation of a loan in the event of a borrower default, which materially reduces the 
borrowing costs for the loan guarantee recipient. Federal loan guarantees fill a unique gap in the market by 
increasing investments to clean energy projects that otherwise may not have been able to procure private sector 
financing. The DOE program has authorized $32.4 billion in loan guarantees to companies including Tesla 
Motors, Inc. and Solyndra, Inc.12 The Loan Guarantee Program helped establish one of the world’s largest wind 
farms, the largest concentrated solar power plant in the world and the largest utility scale photovoltaic 
generation facility.12 In December 2013, the DOE issued a solicitation for applications from qualifying 
Advanced Fossil Energy Projects; under this solicitation, the DOE is authorized to grant loan guarantees 
through November 30, 2016.13 
 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (State-Level Policy) 
 A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is a regulatory mandate, currently only at the state-level, to 
increase energy production from renewable and other alternative energy sources to fossil and nuclear 
generation. Currently, 29 states and Washington, D.C. have renewable portfolio standards, while 9 states have 
renewable portfolio goals.14 RPSs are common at that state-level, and in some European countries, and are most 
effective in driving renewable energy growth when coupled with accommodating federal policies (e.g. PTC). 
Resource Type Begin Construction Deadline Credit Amount
Wind December 31, 2013 2.3¢/kWh
Closed-Loop Biomass December 31, 2013 2.3¢/kWh
Open-Loop Biomass December 31, 2013 1.1¢/kWh
Geothermal Energy December 31, 2013 2.3¢/kWh
Landfill Gas December 31, 2013 1.1¢/kWh
Municipal Solid Waste December 31, 2013 1.1¢/kWh
Qualified Hydroelectric December 31, 2013 1.1¢/kWh
Marine and Hydrokinetic 
(150 kW or larger) December 31, 2013 1.1¢/kWh
Source: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
Table 3: Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit (PTC)
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3. Relative Effectiveness of Cash Grants and Tax Credits in Driving Renewable Growth 
This section aims to analyze the relative efficiencies of current public policies within the clean energy 
sector, building on existing literature. Although current policies have helped grow total renewable energy 
capacity, concerns persist regarding the consistent stability of recent public policies, the complexity of the tax 
equity structure and the inefficiencies of the PTC and ITC relative to the Section 1603 Cash Grant. 
 
3.1 Regulatory Risks Associated with Cash Grants and Tax Credits Inhibit Sustained Development 
 The inconsistent durability of prevailing public policies within the clean energy sector has resulted in 
boom-and-bust investment cycles, shaking investor confidence. The Section 1603 program was only authorized 
briefly during the 2009–2011 period, while the ITC is expected to step down from 30 percent of a project’s 
eligible cost basis to 10 percent in 2017.15 A 20 percent tax credit reduction can materially affect the financial 
health and outlook of the renewable energy industry. Furthermore, each time the PTC has expired, wind project 
instillation rates have fallen dramatically, as shown below. The regulatory risk associated with an uncertain and 
evolving policy landscape has inhibited the steady development of renewable technology project instillations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Tax Credits Facilitate Tax Equity Capital Structures and Elevate Financing Costs 
 Tax credit structures (PTC and ITC) are not an ideal fit for renewable energy projects. According to 
Felix Mormann, a faculty fellow at Stanford’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance, 
policymakers overlooked the fact that renewable energy projects lack, “the quintessential requirement to benefit 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance, AWEA
573 
43 
1,714 
410 
1,766 
467 
2,017 
0 
500 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
2,500 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Figure 1: U.S. Wind Project Instillations (MW) 
PTC expires 
Dec. 2001, 
extended 
Feb. 2002 
PTC expires 
Dec. 2003, 
extended 
Oct. 2004  
PTC expires 
June 1999, 
extended 
Dec. 1999 
        (92%)                           3,886%                         (76%)                             331%                        (74%)                             332% 
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from tax credits.”15 This quintessential requirement is a high enough tax bill to offset the tax credits. Most 
renewable energy developers are either small in size or lack sufficient profitability to generate adequate tax 
liabilities and reap the full benefits of the tax credit. Renewable projects have been incentivized to lower their 
tax burdens even further to benefit from the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS), which 
enables developers to depreciate their project values on an accelerated five-year timetable.16 The accelerated 
depreciation timetable allows companies to lower their Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) Pre-
Tax Income, resulting in a lower tax provision or, in the presence of a net operating loss (NOL), an offsetting 
tax benefit in the future.  
Consequently, a specialized pool of third-party tax equity investors, primarily investment banks and 
insurance companies led by JP Morgan and GE Capital, stepped in to provide tax equity financing in exchange 
for interest payments and the tax credit benefit. A tax equity investment can help the project grow, allowing the 
developer to incur larger tax liabilities and, consequently, more tax benefits. There have only been 
approximately two-dozen sophisticated and highly profitable investors that are willing and able to provide tax 
equity investments to renewable energy projects, and the market demand is highly cyclical.15 During the recent 
global economic recession, the number of tax equity investors shrank to 11 investors from the already low pool 
of around 20, as the tax equity investment market shrunk by over 80 percent (from $6.1 billion in 2007 to $1.2 
billion in 2009).15 Following the financial crisis, the tax equity market rebounded to $6 billion in deal volume 
for solar and wind projects in fiscal year 2011, but there are still less than 20 total investors in the tax equity 
market.15 Due to the fact that a relatively small fraction of the greater investment community participates in the 
tax equity market, project developers compete over a tight supply of potential tax equity investment. A power 
imbalance protrudes between tax equity investors and project developers, which enables investors to secure 
favorable deal terms. Consequently, the large financial firms are able to collect a 7+ percent share on each 
dollar of tax expenditure associated with renewable energy projects.27 In addition, a tax equity investor must be 
confident that a company is willing to produce tax liabilities through the maturity of the tax equity facility. 
Accordingly, the risk and term structures associated with tax equity investments increase a project’s financing 
costs above traditional debt financing levels.  
 In response to the halt in the tax equity market during the global financial crisis, Congress established 
the Section 1603 Cash Grant program in ARRA 2009. The program enabled renewable energy companies to 
receive an equivalent cash grant in lieu of the prevailing ITC incentive. Renewable projects were now faced 
with the option to choose between the two policies. Consequently, the National Commission on Energy Policy 
commissioned Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) to analyze the effectiveness of the ITC and PTC in 
driving renewable energy growth relative to the Section 1603 Cash Grant. The study sought to determine which 
policy deploys taxpayer resources in the most efficient manner by measuring capacity instillation additions 
relative to government tax expenditures. During 2005–2008 there were nearly 19 GW of new wind capacity 
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installed, which resulted in a $10.3 billion tax credit liability to the federal government.16 According to the 
BNEF analysis, the federal government could have achieved the same amount of new wind capacity through 
approximately $5 billion in cash grant expenditures.16 In other words, one dollar in cash has been approximately 
twice as effective in facilitating the development of wind generation as compared to one dollar of tax credits. 
The primary results from the BNEF analysis are shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Through the tax equity financing structure, a renewable developer only receives a portion of the allotted 
tax credit benefits, while the balance is transferred to the tax equity investor. Federal tax expenditures do not 
directly achieve their objective of delivering benefits to the renewable energy industry under the current tax 
credit incentive system. In a period when federal national debt levels have eclipsed $17 trillion, the efficient use 
of taxpayer resources is critical. As demonstrated by the BNEF analysis, a transition to a cash grant program as 
opposed to the prevailing tax credit may lead to equivalent capacity instillations for roughly half of the taxpayer 
resources. Such findings have encouraged policymakers to reevaluate the effectiveness of current policies 
within the clean energy sector and search for new policy mechanisms, including those that may exist outside of 
the traditional tax-credit realm. Policymakers have proposed the widespread introduction of the MLP corporate 
structure as a potential policy solution for renewable energy development. Renewable energy developers have 
begun to form YieldCos, which also benefit from low corporate-level taxation given the pass-through 
structure’s ability to access accelerated depreciation rates under current tax policy.  
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance PTC Ridge vs. Debt Valley financial model
$532,298  
$556,135  $540,200  $552,135  
$270,205  
$292,660  $283,886  
$238,468  
$0  
$100,000  
$200,000  
$300,000  
$400,000  
$500,000  
$600,000  
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Figure 2: Projected Cost to Federal Government of  
Adding 1 MW of New Wind Capacity  
Tax Subsidy Cash Grant 
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4. Pass-Through Structures: Master Limited Partnership Overview 
4.1 History of Master Limited Partnerships 
A master limited partnership is a pass-through corporate structure whose ownership interests are traded 
in units on financial markets, like corporate stock. MLPs are able to operate with the liquidity of a publicly 
traded partnership, while avoiding the entity level taxation of a C-corporation. Rather than being taxed at the 
corporate entity level, MLPs are taxed on the quarterly distributions issued to their limited partners, similar to a 
corporate stock dividend. Since Apache Oil Company became the country’s first MLP in 1981, the asset class 
has grown to a market capitalization of approximately $480 billion.17  
Congress first created the MLP structure in the 1980s in response to the energy crisis of the 1970s. The 
corporate structure was established to drive investment into the energy sector (primarily for oil and gas 
exploration, production, refining, storage and transportation) by offering tax advantages to investors.18 After 
Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which lowered the top marginal individual income tax to a rate 
below the top marginal corporate tax, a large amount of partnership businesses began to structure themselves as 
MLPs, including the Boston Celtics.18 The same Act also implemented passive loss rules that prevent investors 
from using MLP deductions to offset other income sources, but the policy did not stop companies from 
registering into the business partnership structure. The success of the MLP structure eventually led to concerns 
that a large number of corporations would become MLPs, avoid corporate taxes and, ultimately, erode the 
corporate tax base. As a result, Congress modified the regulations of MLPs in 1987, stating that the publicly 
traded partnerships would be considered C-corporations for tax purposes. The MLP structure would only be 
available to companies that generated at least 90 percent of its income from “qualifying sources,” including 
royalties, rents and conventional natural resources (e.g. oil, natural gas, petroleum products, coal, timber and 
other minerals).18 Since, there have been two additional amendments to the prevailing MLP legislation. First, in 
2004 the American Jobs Creation Act extended the potential MLP investor base by allowing mutual funds to 
invest in MLPs.18 Second, the recent Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA 2008) expanded 
the definition of qualifying income to include the transportation and storage of ethanol and biodiesel, as well as 
activities encompassing industrial sources of carbon dioxide.18 It is important to note that the current MLP 
qualification continues to explicitly exclude “inexhaustible resources,” or renewable energy technologies.  
Structure
Security Type Units Units Units Shares
Tax Level Unit Holder Unit Holder Unit Holder Unit Holder Corp., Shareholder
Tax Filing K-1 K-1 K-1 K-1 1099s
Payments Distributions Distributions Distributions Distributions Distributions
Tax Treatment of Payments 80% + Tax Deferred 80% + Tax Deferred Ordinary Income 50% + Tax Deferred 15-34% Tax Rate
Primary Investor Base Retail Retail Retail/Institutional Retail/Institutional Institutional
Governance Poor Better Poor Better Good
Voting Rights No Yes No No Yes
General Partner Yes No No No No
Incentive Distribution Rights (IDRs) Yes No No No No
Source: Credit Suisse Oil & Gas Primer
Units
Table 4: MLPs vs Other Corporate Structures
MLPs LLCs Royalty Trusts REITs Corporations 
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4.2 The MLP Parity Act (MLPPA) 
 Policymakers have proposed a potential change in the qualifying criteria for MLPs to include renewable 
energy technologies. The widespread introduction of MLPs to the renewable energy industry can be legislated 
through changes to the qualifying income criteria in a manner that parallels the qualification expansions in the 
aforementioned EESA 2008. U.S. Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) has spearheaded the effort behind the MLPPA, 
which would amend such qualifications. Senator Coons views the bill as a means to “level the playing field” by 
granting renewable energy developers with access to the tax and financing advantages their fossil fuel-based 
counterparts have been experiencing for decades.19 The bill initially received bipartisan co-sponsorship and, in 
September 2012, was referred to the Committee on Finance; however, some critics have indicated that they 
would not support the MLPPA until tax credit incentives for renewable energy projects are eliminated.17 Senator 
Coons opposed the elimination of the PTC and ITC in exchange for MLPPA support, and the bill has since 
remained trapped in committee.20 
 
4.3 Incentive Distribution Rights Align General Partner Compensation with Limited Partner Interest 
MLPs are limited partnerships with one or more general partners (GPs) and several limited partners 
(LPs). The GPs typically hold a 2 percent ownership stake and manage the partnership.15 The LPs provide 
capital in exchange for cash distributions, but have no say in the partnership’s management or operational 
execution.15 GPs and LPs interests are aligned in the corporate structure through incentive distribution rights 
(IDRs), which grant GPs with a preferred share of the partnership’s distributions. Typically, 49 percent of the 
ownership stake is issued to the public as common unit, while the remaining 49 percent of the units are 
subordinated and held by the financial sponsor or parent company related to the GPs for IDRs. The 
subordinated units essentially create 2-to-1 free cash flow coverage levels for common unit holders; free cash 
flow at the MLP would have to decrease by 50 percent before common unit holders’ distributions are reduced. 
As quarterly distributions to the LPs rise, IDRs to GPs increase. As shown in the sample table below, up to 11.5 
percent the LPs would collect 98 percent of the distribution rights, and each incremental yield gain above the 
11.5 percent hurdle rate will be shared as indicated below.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yield (X) Limited Partners General Partner
X ≤ 11.5% 98% 2%
11.5% < X ≤ 12.5% 85% 15%
12.5% < X ≤ 15% 75% 25%
X > 15% 50% 50%
Source: Latham & Watkins LLP
Table 5: MLP Incentive Distribution Rights Sample Tiers
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MLPs often pay out virtually all of their distributable cash flows to LPs, except for the capital that 
management considers necessary to conduct and grow business operations. Although the IDR structure 
increases the likelihood that the parent-GP will ensure that the MLP reaches its dividend growth targets for LPs, 
“high split,” IDRs can be problematic for the partnership. In high split IDR situations, the GP can claim 50 
percent of incremental cash distributed by the MLP, stifling growth and burdening cash flow generation. The 
IDRs incentivize GPs to grow distribution yields for LPs, but may increase the cost of capital in the long run, as 
each new distribution must generate sufficient returns to cover both GP and LP shares. 
 
4.4 MLP Structure Has a Strong, Proven Track Record Within the Energy Sector 
The attractiveness of the MLP structure itself can draw investors who otherwise may not have been 
willing or able to participate in renewable projects. MLPs as an asset class provide investors with superior risk-
adjusted returns, attractive income-generating yields (typically falling in the 6 to 7 percent range), preferential 
tax treatment and low correlation to other asset classes.23 The increased investment appetite for MLPs combine 
with the benefits of lower costs of capital to make MLPs (and other pass-through partnerships) an effective 
policy solution in driving energy development broadly.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Superior Risk-Adjusted Returns
   Low Volatility, Low Standard Deviation, Low Correlation to Broader Market
Metric
Compound Annual Growth 
Rate (CAGR) 15.1% 8.8% 6.4% 12.0% 15.5% 7.2%
10-year through 2/28/14
Standard Deviation 4.7% 7.4% 3.8% 9.2% 7.8% 4.2%
Correlation to S&P 500 0.47 0.76 0.53 0.66 0.60 1.00
Beta 0.52 1.34 0.48 1.44 1.11 1.00
Volatility measure relative to 
broader market
Sharpe Ratio (Risk-
Adjusted Return) 2.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.5 0.9
Excess Return / Volatility 
Alpha 9.7% 0.4% 1.2% 3.2% 7.9% 0.0%
Measure of performance beyond 
systematic risk/return profile 
(Beta). Alpha is often considered 
the portion of returns provided 
by managerial selection and 
performance
As of 2/28/14; Source: Alerian, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse
Table 6: Performance Metrics 
MLPs REITs Utilities S&P Oilfield Services S&P E&P Index S&P 500
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5. Pass-Through Structures: YieldCo Overview 
5.1 Yield Companies (YieldCo or ‘Synthetic MLP’) 
 While MLPs remain exclusive to oil, gas and other conventional energy competitors, renewable energy 
developers have recently begun to create publicly traded yield-generating companies known as YieldCos. 
Similar to an MLP, a YieldCo is a dividend-oriented company that distributes up to 90 percent of its available 
cash flow to shareholders, including both GPs and LPs. The current MACRS tax depreciation system enables 
renewable energy developers to use an accelerated depreciation timetable. Therefore, YieldCos can report 
accounting losses, ultimately replicating the tax benefits of an MLP structure. Both YieldCos and MLPs are 
characterized by the ownership of energy infrastructure with contracted long-term contracted cash flows, most 
of which is distributed to shareholders. In addition, both business structures generally maintain close 
partnerships with a parent or financial sponsor in order to drive growth through announced drop-downs.29 
YieldCos typically enter Right-Of-First-Offer (ROFO) agreements with its sponsor/parent, which covers a 
predetermined group of assets that are likely to be dropped-down over time to the YieldCo. For instance, NRG 
Yield’s parent company, NRG Energy, would consider selling another 1,500MW to NRG Yield, or 
approximately 50 percent of its current capacity levels.29  
NRG Yield became the first publicly traded YieldCo in July 2013, when NRG Energy (the parent 
company) sold approximately 35 percent of the company in an initial public offering (IPO).29 Since, YieldCos 
have grown to reach a combined market capitalization of greater than $10 billion, with five new YieldCos going 
public over the last twelve-month period.29 NRG Yield’s share price has more than doubled since its IPO, while 
even the weakest performing YieldCo entities have impressively appreciated by approximately 25 percent.  
 
 
 
 
Investment Characteristic MLP YieldCo
Most Available Cash Flows Distributed to Investors Yes Yes
Own Energy Infrastructure Yes Yes
Focus on Growth of Dividends / Distributions Yes Yes
Dividends / Distirbution Tax Deferral Potential Yes Yes
Limited or No Cash Taxes at Entity Level No Tax Limited Tax
Dividends / Distributions Taxed at Lower Qualified Rate Ordinary Income Dividend Tax Rate
General Partner and Incentive Distribution Rights Inclusion Yes Sometimes 
Voting Rights No Yes
Tax Reporting K-1 1099
Source: Morgan Stanley Research
Table 7: MLP and YieldCo Comparison
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5.2 Incentives for Forming a YieldCo 
 Developers find YieldCos to be attractive for several reasons. First, the pass-through structure facilitate 
higher valuations for renewable energy assets relative to if the same assets were housed within a utilities parent 
company.29 Traditional utilities and merchant power companies are valued based on Price/Earnings or 
Enterprise Value/EBITDA multiples. Such valuation methodologies are ‘capital structure neutral,’ meaning that 
they do not consider the benefits associated with lower cash tax expenses, maintenance capital expenditures and 
financing costs. On the other hand, YieldCos are typically valued based 
on Cash Flow Available for Distribution and the subsequent yield for 
shareholders. Therefore, by placing renewable assets into a YieldCo 
structure, renewable developers receive higher valuations for those 
assets, as investors generally base valuations in a methodology that 
considers the lower tax provisions and borrowing costs associated with 
pass-through structures. Second, with regards to debt, YieldCo 
borrowing costs have been around the 5 percent range despite leverage 
levels of 5.0x to 7..0x EBITDA; meanwhile, equity dividend yields have 
fluctuated between a low 2 and 5 percent.29 These financing costs compare well to recent asset acquisitions, 
which have ranged in about the 10 to 12 percent range for debt borrowing costs with a 7 to 9 percent equity 
dividend yield.29  
 
5.3 Risks to YieldCo Investors 
 As a substantial majority of the YieldCo entities’ cash flows are distributed to shareholders, YieldCos 
(and MLPs) are heavily reliant on financial markets to raise capital and fund growth.29 Therefore, capital 
markets risk persists; a rise in the cost of debt or equity capital for YieldCos can hinder the entities’ ability to 
generate cash flow for distributions. However, YieldCos that are more focused on ROFO drop-downs can 
continually grow with modest levels of capital markets activity, since those YieldCos have a telegraphed 
pipeline of potential assets for acquisition that may already have project-level debt attached to them.29 In 
addition, YieldCos contain liquidity risk, especially as compared to the more mature MLP asset class. Most 
YieldCos today have relatively small market capitalizations; the largest YieldCos are around $3 to $4 billion, 
most of which is owned by the parent company/sponsor.29 Consequently, YieldCo daily trading volumes are 
relatively low, which means it cannot be traded as easily as other assets in the market. As YieldCo entities grow 
and more companies form YieldCo structures, trading volumes will increase over several years.   
 
 
 
 
“If these higher multiples 
persist, owning a yield vehicle 
will provide (renewable 
developer) sponsors with an 
attractive equity currency to 
buy assets or gain access to 
capital at a significantly lower 
cost than otherwise available.” 
 
– Moody’s Investor Service 	  
Source: Moody’s Announcement New MLP’s, Yieldcos Expected 
in the Utilities/Power Sector (March 20, 2014) 
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6. Financial Analysis: Methodology 
6.1 Financial Model Assumptions Based on Solar Comparable Companies Analysis   
The renewable energy industry has received a multitude of support from various public policies. 
Throughout the sector, most direct financial support has come in the form of tax credits and cash grants. 
Prevailing discourse has examined the relative effectiveness of cash grants and tax credits in achieving policy 
objectives. The relative inefficiency of the tax credit incentive, especially compared to the cash grant program, 
prompted policymakers to seek alternative policy solutions, including the MLP structure. Accordingly, this 
thesis seeks to analyze the relative efficiency of cash grants, tax credits and pass-through tax structures (MLPs 
and YieldCos) as policy options for facilitating renewable energy industry. Using a model based on existing 
solar companies, this thesis contributes a detailed, fundamental analysis of the implications the various policies 
can have on the financial health and outlook of a renewable energy developer (see Appendix). In addition this 
thesis seeks to further renewable policy discourse by financially evaluating pass-through limited partnerships 
side-by-side with cash grants and tax credits. The goal of the analysis was to determine how the different 
policies affect a renewable developer’s free cash flow relative to the subsequent tax revenue loss to the 
government. The most effective policies will convert tax expenditures directly into incremental free cash flow, 
with minimal cash leakage (e.g. tax equity interest payments).  
 In order to model a hypothetical solar company, a comparable companies analysis was conducted on 
five of America’s largest solar power developers, manufactures, providers, installers and operators: SolarCity, 
First Solar, Canadian Solar, Inc., SunPower and Vivint Solar. The analysis was used to determine key business 
metrics including margins, enterprise valuation multiples, cost of debt, capital expenditures and working capital 
requirements. The main assumption inputs in the financial model that were derived from the comparable 
companies analysis are shown below. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Solar Comparable Companies Analysis ($ in millions)
    LTM 6/30/14          EV Total Debt    EV/Debt Cash EBITDA Debt/EBITDA Revenue Gross Profit Operating Income Pre-Tax Income ∆ Working Capital Cash Int. Expense Capex
                                (SCTY) 5,876         840            7.0x 405          (179)           -4.7x 221            65              (225)               (177)               126                 (10)                 (10)            
                                (FSLR) 4,499         195            23.1x 1,349       651            0.3x 3,529         883            409                 378                 187                 (10)                 (225)           
                               (CSIQ) 2,503         1,176         2.1x 341          212            5.6x 2,101         388            195                 56                  (485)               (65)                 (23)            
                               (SPWR) 4,331         1,110         3.9x 988          330            3.4x 2,496         581            231                 42                  (14)                 (46)                 (35)            
                               (VSLR) 1,692         141            12.0x 25           292            0.5x 483            355            (53)                 (125)               N/A N/A (9)              
    Average 3,780         692            9.6x 622          261            1.0x 1,766         454            111                 35                  (47)                 (33)                 (60)            
Source: Bloomberg, figures represent last twelve-months as of June 30, 2014
LTM 6/30/14 Gross Margin EBITDA Margin EV/ EBITDA Pre-Tax Margin ΔWC as a Capex as a Int. Expense / Cash / EV
(Gross Profit / Revenue) (EBITDA / Revenue) (Pre-Tax Income / EBITDA) % of Revenue % of Revenue Total Debt
Rounded Average 25.0% 15.0% 14.5x 13.5% 2.5% 3.5% 5.0% 16.0%
Source: Bloomberg, last twelve-months as of June 30, 2014
Table 9: Financial Model Assumptions Derived From Solar Comparable Companies Analysis
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6.2 Independent Variable: Income Generation and EBITDA Levels 
 The hypothetical solar company in the financial model was built using the solar comparable companies 
analysis. The model simulated the effects a cash grant, a tax credit and pass-through corporate structure have on 
a singular solar company’s free cash flow generating ability. A company’s ability to generate free cash flow 
determines its ability to service its debt obligations, reinvest into the business and accelerate long-term growth. 
Free cash flows were calculated after accounting for the effect the various policies have on tax provisions and 
cash interest payments. To isolate the effects the policies have on free cash flow conversion in the model, the 
company operates with identical revenues, gross margins, EBITDA margins and pre-tax income margins 
throughout the policy cases. EBITDA is a non-GAAP metric that stands for earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization. EBITDA measures a company’s profitability and is used to represent a 
company’s true ability to generate cash flow irrespective of tax policy, depreciation strategy, capital structure 
and interest expense (which vary between policy scenarios). Although the policies directly influence a 
renewable company’s tax provisions and interest expenses, the solar company generates the same EBITDA 
levels across the policy cases. In addition, the pre-tax margin figure is taken from the solar comparable 
companies analysis in order to accurately reflect the size of a solar company’s tax provision relative to its 
revenues throughout the various policy cases. Working capital and capital expenditure levels were in line with 
the comparable companies analysis and were held constant across the policy options to reflect the same core 
business needs. It is important that the solar company has the same normalized profitability prior to the changes 
in capital and tax structures that result from the policy cases in order to accurately determine thee policies’ 
relative effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company Financials by Tax Policy ($ in millions) FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017
Income Summary Assumptions 12/31/14 12/31/15 12/31/16 12/31/17
Revenues 1,000        1,270        1,613        2,048        
Growth (Year-over-Year) (1) 27.0% 27.0% 27.0%
Cost of Goods Sold (750)         (953)         (1,210)       (1,536)       
Gross Profit 250          318          403          512          
Gross Margin 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
EBITDA 150          191          242          307          
EBITDA Margin 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%
Change (bps) 0 bps 0 bps 0 bps
Pre-Tax Income 20           26           33           41           
Pre-Tax Margin 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 13.5%
Base Case
Figure 3: Independent Variable Appendix Reference
Independent Variable: 
Income Generation & 
EBITDA 
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6.3 Dependent Variable: Effects of Policy Scenarios on Cash Flow, Financing Costs and Tax Provisions 
 Free cash flow (FCF) represents the cash that a company generates after outlaying the capital required to 
maintain business operations, service debt obligations and cover tax provisions. In other words, FCF represents 
EBITDA after considering tax policy and capital structure requirements. Free cash flow was selected as a means 
of explaining how the different tax and corporate structures affect a company’s ability to convert its income into 
growth. From the government’s perspective, measuring the amount of tax expenditures relative to the amount of 
cash flow gained to the company provides insight into the portion of tax expenditures that reach the company 
after accounting for federal taxes and other costs associated with the underlying policy scenario. Free cash flow 
is the cash the company generates after realizing the effects of the tax policies. At a high level, free EBITDA 
levels drive cash flow available to investors, less debt and tax equity service, as most other outflows are 
relatively modest. 
 
 
 
Base Case 
The cost of debt in the base case is 5 percent (rounded average from the comparable companies analysis) 
and the company incurs the conventional 35 percent corporate tax rate. The government does not experience 
any tax revenue loss. A 5 percent interest rate was held consistent as a baseline for traditional debt financing 
throughout the policy scenarios, except for in the pass-through status scenario (4 percent interest rate) to reflect 
the structure’s affect on reducing costs of capital. The base case represents a solar company operating in an 
environment without benefitting from any renewable energy tax policy (cash grant, tax credit, pass-through 
structure). The solar company’s enterprise value was determined by the EBITDA multiple derived from the 
solar comparable companies analysis. The model also assumes a constant, modest leverage level across all 
policy scenarios. In the tax credit case, the same aggregate leverage level (2.0x EBITDA) was applied between 
tax equity and traditional debt financing.  
 
Cash Grant 
In the cash grant case, the company incurs the same 35 percent corporate tax rate as in the base case, but 
also receives a tax benefit equivalent to 30 percent of capital expenditures through 2016, until the benefit steps 
down to 10 percent of expenditures. The tax revenue loss to the government is equal in value to the tax credit 
benefits to the company. The cash grant does not necessitate tax equity financing (like in the tax credit 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) = EBITDA – Cash Int. Expense – Cash Tax Provision – Δ Working Capital – Capital Expenditures 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) = Cash from Operations – Capital Expenditures  
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scenario), and thus incurs the same debt financing costs as the base case. The cash grant scenario replicates the 
effects of receiving a cash injection in lieu of the prevailing investment tax credit incentive.  
 
Tax Credit 
In the tax credit scenario, the company experiences the same corporate tax provisions and tax benefits as 
the cash grant, while the foregone government tax expenditure is the tax credit benefits to the company (equal 
in value to the cash grant scenario). However, in the tax credit case the company enters a tax equity financing 
structure. According to BNEF, the average tax equity yield jumped from a normalized 6 percent to 9 percent 
following the recent global financial crisis. Accordingly, the model assumes a 7 percent interest rate for tax 
equity financing.  
The tax equity market is relatively opaque, but BNEF estimates that tax equity generally constitutes 60 
percent of capital expenditures16 On the other hand, solar companies including SolarCity tend to have tax equity 
leverage levels closer to 80 percent.25 Accordingly, the model assumes a 70 percent tax equity level relative to 
its total financing, or the sum of both tax equity and debt facilities. The change in the company’s capital 
structure composition to include more tax equity, and less debt, in the tax equity scenario ultimately leads to a 
higher weighted average cost of capital for the company. A higher borrowing cost drags on both cash flow 
generation and a company’s growth outlook. The extent to which tax equity financing hinders a renewable 
energy development is dependent on the amount and cost of tax equity invested at the company level and the 
cost of the tax equity facility itself. A sensitivities analysis was conducted to demonstrate how such assumptions 
could affect the results of the financial model.  
 
Pass-Through Structure 
 In the pass-through scenario, the solar company incurs no cash tax provision at the entity level. 
Therefore, the tax revenue loss is equivalent to the corporate tax rate provision, which the government would 
have collected had the entity not registered under the pass-through structure. Like the other policy scenarios, the 
pass-through case assumes total financing levels of 2.0x EBITDA, but the accompanying lower cost of capital is 
reflected through a lower 4 percent interest rate on the debt facility.  
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Cash Flow Summary
EBITDA 150          191          242          307          
Debt Cash Interest Expense (5.0% Rate / 4.0% for Pass-Through) (15)           (19)           (24)           (31)           
Tax Equity Cash Interest Expense (7.0% Rate) -              -              -              -              
Tax Provision (7)            (9)            (11)           (15)           
Effective Tax Rate (35%) (35%) (35%) (35%)
Tax Benefit -              -              -              -              
Effective Tax Credit (% of Capex) -              -              -              -              
Working Capital (25)           (32)           (40)           (51)           
Cash from Operations 103          131          166          211          
Capital Expenditures (35)           (44)           (56)           (72)           
Free Cash Flow (Cash Flow Available for Distribution) 68           86           110          139          
FCF Conversion (as a % of Revenue) 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8%
NPV of Free Cash Flow (8% Discount Rate) $326.03
NPV of Tax Revenue Loss (3% Discount Rate) -              
(Δ(Base) NPV FCF / Δ(Base) NPV Tax Revenue Loss) -              
EBITDA - Capex 115          146          185          236          
Balance Sheet Summary
Cash 348          442          561          713          
Total Debt 300          381          484          615          
Tax Equity -              -              -              -              
Enterprise Value 2,175        2,762        3,508        4,455        
EV / EBITDA 14.5x 14.5x 14.5x 14.5x
Credit Statistics 
Total Debt / EBITDA 2.0x 2.0x 2.0x 2.0x
Tax Equity / EBITDA -              -              -              -              
EV / Total Debt 7.3x 7.3x 7.3x 7.3x
EV / Tax Equity -              -              -              -              
EBITDA / Total Interest 10.0x 10.0x 10.0x 10.0x
(EBITDA - Capex) / Total Interest 7.7x 7.7x 7.7x -7.7x
FCF / Total Debt 22.6% 22.6% 22.6% 22.6%
FCF / Tax Equity -              -              -              -              
Figure 4: Dependent Variable Appendix Reference
 
Effects of Policy Scenarios: 
Debt & Tax Equity Service + 
Tax Provision + Operating & 
Maintenance Expenses 
 
 
Effects of Policy Scenarios: 
Debt & Tax Equity Service + 
Tax Provision  
Dependent Variable:    
Δ Free Cash Flow (Solar 
Company) / Δ Tax Revenue Loss 
(Government) 
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6.4 Key Metric: ΔBaseCase Free Cash Flow / ΔBaseCase Tax Revenue Loss 
 Consistent with U.S. government financial models, the net present value of the incremental tax revenue 
loss is calculated using a 3 percent discount rate. The net present value of the incremental free cash flow is 
determined using an 8 percent discount rate; typically the private sector uses a higher discount rate than the 
government. A higher discount rate implies that the future is valued less (a dollar is more valuable today, 
relative to a dollar tomorrow), possibly as a result of a relatively riskier or uncertain forecasted outlook. The key 
metric serves as a measure of the relative efficiencies at each policy converts tax expenditures into incremental 
free cash flow for a renewable energy developer. Free cash flow is the cash the company generates after 
considering depreciation strategy, tax provisions and interest expenses (which is determined by the policy 
scenarios). The metric helps establish the relative abilities of the policies to effectively deploy taxpayer 
resources by measuring the cash flow benefit to the company relative to the tax revenue loss for the government 
under each policy scenario. This metric will help determine how efficient each policy is in furthering renewable 
energy development for each dollar in government tax expenditures.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 100 120 140
Typical Solar Contract ($ / mwh)
Debt + Tax Equity Service
Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research
Tax Provision + 
Operating & 
Maintenance Expenses
Free Cash Flow / Cash Flow 
Available for Distribution ($ / mwh)
Figure 5: Policy Scenarios Influence Financing Costs, Tax Provision and 
Ultimately Free Cash Flow
Independent 
Variable 
Effects of Policy 
Scenarios 
Dependent 
Variable 
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7. Financial Analysis: Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Summary of Results by Policy Scenario 
Base Case 
 With the 35 percent corporate tax rate and a 5 percent interest rate for its debt obligations, the base case 
generated $326 million in FCF over the 2014 to 2017 period. The government experiences no tax revenue loss, 
as the company is not capitalizing on any renewable energy tax policy. The base case scenario serves as a 
reference point to evaluate the effectiveness of the subsequent policy options. 
 
Cash Grant 
The cash grant case leveraged the federal grant to generate approximately $366 million in FCF, or a $40 
million net increase above the base case. From the government’s perspective, the company still outlays the 35 
 ($ in millions) Base Case Cash Grant Tax Credit
Net Present Value (NPV) of 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 326.0        365.9         345.7          374.5           
8% Discount Rate
ΔNPV of FCF Relative to 
Base Case -           39.9          19.7           48.4            
% Growth 12% 6% 15%
Weighted Average Cost of 
Debt and Tax Equity 5.0% 5.0% 6.4% 4.0%
Net Present Value (NPV) of 
Tax Revenue Loss -              44.6          44.6           38.7            
3% Discount Rate
ΔNPV of Tax Revenue 
Loss Relative to Base Case -              44.6          44.6           38.7            
a
Effective Tax Rate (35%) (35%) (35%) 0%
Tax Credit Benefit
As a % of Capital Expenditures
Δ(Base) NPV of FCF / Δ(Base) 
NPV of Tax Revenue Loss
Table 10: Key Findings
A measure of the cash flow 
benefit to the company 
relative to the tax revenue 
loss for the government
-              89% 44% 125%
-              -                 
30% of 
expenditures 
until 2016, 10% 
thereafter
30% of 
expenditures until 
2016, 10% 
thereafter
Pass-Through 
Tax Status
	  
25 
percent corporate tax rate but now receives a tax credit based on capital expenditures. The tax revenue loss is 
equivalent to the tax credit benefit the company receives (30 percent of expenditures through 2016, 10 percent 
thereafter). Accordingly, the government tax loss in the cash grant scenario was approximately $45 million. 
Therefore, each $1 increase in tax revenue loss resulted in a direct $0.89 increase in free cash flow at the given 
8 and 3 percent discount rates for free cash flow and tax revenue loss, respectively. The financial model reached 
the same conclusion as BNEF in determining that cash grants are approximately twice as effective in deploying 
taxpayer resources relative to tax credits. 
 
Tax Credit 
 In the tax credit scenario, the government tax expenditures are equal to those in the cash grant ($45 
million). However, the company’s higher cost of debt leads to higher cash interest expenses, which ultimately 
drains FCF. Consequently, the company generated $346 million in FCF, or a $20 million net increase above the 
base case scenario. Although tax credits have played, and continue to play, an instrumental role in renewable 
energy growth, the policy inefficiently allocates taxpayer resources. The tax credit policy option was 44 percent 
efficient in converting tax expenditures into incremental FCF to a renewable energy developer. Each $1 
increase in tax revenue only resulted in a direct $0.44 increase in free cash flow. Accordingly, the financial 
model corroborated Bloomberg’s conclusion, which stated that government expenditures through cash grants 
are twice as effective in driving renewable energy development than expenditures through tax credits. From the 
company’s perspective, the tax equity financing structure elevates costs of capital, hindering a renewable energy 
project’s financial growth outlook and ability to attract investors.  
 
Pass-Through Tax Status 
 In the pass-through case, the company incurs no tax provision at the entity level. Therefore, the tax 
revenue loss is equivalent to the corporate tax rate provision, which the government would have collected had it 
not been for the pas-through structure. The tax revenue loss for the pass-through scenario was $39 million, 
lower than in both the tax credit and cash grant cases. The company leveraged its advantaged tax status to 
generate $375 million in FCF, or a net gain of $48 million above the base case. Although the pass-through 
structure resulted in lower FCF generation relative to the cash grant, pass-through structures are relatively more 
efficient in directing tax expenditures towards their policy objectives. In the pass-through structure, there is no 
actual transaction that takes place between the government and the company, as is the case with a cash grant or 
a tax credit. Instead, the company keeps the tax revenue loss from the outset through its pass-through tax status, 
limiting cash leakage inefficiencies in the process.  
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7.2 Pass-Through Structures (MLPs and YieldCos) Most Efficiently Deploy Taxpayer Resources 
Cash grants and the pass-through structures were both relatively efficient in their use of taxpayer 
resources according to the financial model. However, the financial analysis revealed that pass-through tax 
structures are more efficiently able to convert tax expenditures into free cash flow for renewable energy 
developers. The ancillary benefits that come with a pass-through tax status position the business structure as the 
optimal alignment of interests between policy objectives and investor incentives for the renewable energy 
industry. Pass-through structures are more beneficial to both the government and the private sector in 
facilitating renewable energy growth. The absence of taxes at the corporate level provides MLPs and YieldCos 
with a lower cost of capital, or the cost of obtaining capital through debt, equity or tax equity.23 A lower cost of 
capital increases the pass-through structure’s relative attractiveness to investors by enabling such companies to 
pursue projects that might not be feasible for a taxable corporation. It is important to also note that the pass-
through structure is designed as a dividend-oriented mechanism; the company does not keep all of the cash flow 
gain it receives from its tax benefit, but rather distributes most of its available cash flow to shareholders.  
The pass-through structure serves as an efficient vehicle to manage steady, cash flow generating assets 
for a parent company, who can then efficiently distribute yield-oriented dividends to investors and, ultimately, 
attract a larger investor base. MLPs and YieldCos, for instance, raise capital from a retail investor base, which 
helps democratize the future growth of the nation’s renewable energy. While the prevailing tax credit structure 
limits investments to the small community of tax equity investors, pass-through structures open the renewable 
energy industry to an alternative pool of investors with a competitive source of equity capital.  
Certain renewable energy companies with relatively mature assets have already begun to capitalize on 
pass-through tax advantages, as evident by the upsurge in publicly traded YieldCos.24 Similar to MLPs, 
YieldCos are pass-through corporate structures that house assets and offer investors with dividends supported 
by a high payout ratio and stable cash flows. Notable YieldCos include NRG Yield, Pattern Energy and 
NextEra Energy Partners. Renewable developers are able to synthetically replicate the benefits of an MLP 
through the YieldCo structure. Like an MLP, a YieldCo pays out most of its distributable cash flow, while 
avoiding the corporate level taxation of a C-corporation. Unlike MLPs who derive their tax benefit from direct 
IRS approval, YieldCos rely on the current depreciation system in America. The Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System (MACRS) allows renewable energy developers to depreciate qualifying assets on a five-year 
timetable. An accelerated depreciation table allows the firm to continually incur accounting losses, while 
receiving offsetting tax benefits in the future. The rise in the YieldCo structure offers a proof-of-concept for 
pass-through business partnerships by demonstrating that the structures can effectively raise capital to drive 
renewable energy development.  
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8. Sensitivity Analysis and Limitations of Analysis 
8.1 Implications of Sensitivity Analysis: Importance of Unlocking a Lower Cost of Capital 
 The results of the financial model are contingent on the assumptions built into the model. As previously 
discussed, most of the assumptions were derived from a comparable companies analysis of leading solar 
developers and providers. However, the relative effectiveness of the policies in converting tax expenditures into 
incremental free cash flow was influenced by the parameters surrounding tax equity and traditional debt 
financing partnerships. The level of debt and tax equity affects the results of the model, in addition to their 
respective borrowing costs. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis was conducted in order to determine how different 
levels and costs of financing would affect the results of the financial analysis. Key findings are shown in Table 
11 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 As Table 11 shows, the efficiency of the cash grant policy remained static across the various sizes and 
costs of the financing facilities. Therefore, since the results are compared relative to a base case scenario, the 
cash grant remains equally as effective as long as the company continues to operate with the same debt levels 
and interest rates as the base case scenario. A cash grant does not materially affect a company’s borrowing costs 
like a tax credit or pass-through structure would.  
(Total Debt + Tax Equity) / EBITDA
0.0x 2.0x
% Tax Equity / (Total 
Equity + Total Debt)
3.0% 89% 89% 0%
5.0% 89% 89% 0%
7.0% 89% 89% 0%
-2.0% 89% 89% 0%
0.0% 89% 89% 0%
+2.0% 89% 89% 0%
-2.0% 89% 135% 70%
0.0% 89% 89% 70%
+2.0% 89% 44% 70%
-2.0% 89% 154% 100%
0.0% 89% 89% 100%
+2.0% 89% 25% 100%
-2.0% 88% 162% 0%
0.0% 88% 88% 0%
+2.0% 88% 13% 0%
Cash Grant Interest Rate
Pass-Through Structure Int. 
Rate Spread (Relative to 
5.0% Base Case)
% = Δ(Base) NPV FCF / 
Δ(Base) NPV Tax Revenue 
Loss
Tax Credit Interest Rate 
Spread (Relative to 5.0% 
Base Case)
Table 11: Sensitivity Analysis Summary 
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In addition, the sensitivity analysis revealed that each policy scenario would be equally efficient in the 
absence of any financing facilities (either debt or tax equity) or when the size and borrowing cost of those 
financing facilities is unchanged from the policies relative to a base case scenario. In practice, tax equity raises 
cost of capital while advantages from valuation uplifts and low entity-level taxation help lower the cost of 
capital for a pass-through tax structure. Rather than adjusting the base case scenario to match the cost of capital 
of the company under the various policy scenarios, the sensitivity analysis measured the relative cost of capital 
spreads between the policies and the base case scenario. The sensitivity analysis showed that both tax credits 
and pass-through structures would most effectively deploy taxpayer resources when operating with a cost of 
debt below that expected from traditional debt financing costs. Therefore, policymakers should search for policy 
solutions that lower a company’s cost of capital, in order to receive the greatest benefits for each dollar of tax 
revenue loss.  
 
8.2 Limitations of Analysis 
Hypothetical Company Based on Solar Developers Without YieldCos 
 The most substantial limitation to the financial analysis is that it was conducted on a hypothetical 
company. In practice, the companies that operate under the various policy scenarios often contain very different 
characteristics. For instance, a pass-through structure would generally incur greater debt levels as compared to a 
company operating under a tax credit incentive as a result of the associated lower cost of capital. In the 
proprietary financial model, the company’s key income generation metrics and financing levels were held 
constant in order to isolate the effects of the policies. The solar companies that were used for the comparable 
companies analysis do not have YieldCos or other pass-through structures, which facilitates the comparison of a 
solar company before and after registering as a pass-through business partnership. The analysis into pass-
through structures can be further improved by using actual YieldCo companies’ data. Since there are relatively 
few YieldCos in existence currently, it is possible to evaluate the entire asset class in a robust manner; an actual 
analysis into the tax benefits received by each YieldCo can provide policymakers with exact metrics into the 
effectiveness of the structure in converting tax expenditures into incremental free cash flow for a renewable 
developer. A financial model of NRG Yield is included in the Appendix for reference. The effects of the policy 
will vary from one entity to another depending on business needs and capital structure requirements. 
 
Current Market Environment May Heighten Appeal of Pass-Through Structures  
 Largely a result of the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, financial markets are currently in an 
ultra-low interest rate environment. Therefore, dividend-oriented asset classes, including MLPs and YieldCos, 
may be relatively more attractive to investors in search for yield. Although pass-through structures have 
weathered business cycles in the past, it is important to note that the impressive recent performance of YieldCos 
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and other pass-through structures is partially supported by an equity-led bull market and low interest rate 
environment. Renewable developers and policymakers alike should be concerned with how YieldCos will 
perform in the strong likelihood of a rising rate environment over the next several years.  
 
Emphasis on Debt Side of Cost of Capital Relative to the Cost of Equity 
 Most of the cost of capital analysis in the proprietary financial model focuses on the cost of debt rather 
than the cost of equity. As pass-through structures facilitate liquidity enhancements by allowing shares to trade 
publicly on an exchange with a more competitive source of equity capital. These structures can lower cost of 
equity, in addition to the reduction in the cost of debt that was seen in the proprietary financial model. More 
analysis can be conducted to determine the effects that publicly traded vehicles have on lowering the cost of 
equity for renewable technology developers.  
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9. Conclusion: Policy Recommendations 
9.1 Government Policy Should Favor Cash Grants in Lieu of Tax Credit Incentives 
The financial analysis was in line with the BNEF conclusion in determining that cash grants are 
approximately twice as effective in deploying taxpayer resources relative to tax credits. Although the tax credit 
is likely to be renewed, policymakers should consider legislating an optional cash grant program in lieu of the 
traditional tax credit incentive, particularly during turbulent periods in the tax equity market. An accompanying 
low guarantee program can lower project funding costs for renewable developers while renewable portfolio 
standards can encourage renewable technology investments. The federal government would more effectively 
achieve its policy objectives with taxpayer resources by favoring cash grant policies over tax credit programs.  
 
9.2 Government Policy Should Support Accommodating Market Environment for YieldCos 
 In the United States, approximately 30 states have some form of a renewable portfolio standard. 
Accordingly, there will be a continual increase in renewable energy capacity, which has doubled over the last 5-
years.29 According to Morgan Stanley Research, renewable energy capacity is expected to double again by the 
end of the decade, as approximately $150 billion will be invested into renewable technology projects.29 
YieldCos are likely to be involved in the forecasted upsurge in renewable energy development. As YieldCos are 
the only available pass-through structure to the renewable energy industry today, the structure can help drive 
renewable energy growth by providing developers with lower financing costs and access to a broader investor 
base.  
Similar to MLPs, the performance of YieldCos can be tied to access to capital, including both equity and 
debt. A rising rate environment is likely to present obstacles for YieldCos in meeting their growth objectives. 
Therefore, the Federal Reserve can best support renewable energy development by facilitating a gradual 
increase in interest rates, to ease the eventual increase in borrowing costs for YieldCos and their investors. In 
addition, the government can benefit from supporting YieldCos who focus on Right-Of-First-Offer (ROFO) 
drop-down asset acquisitions for growth, since those YieldCos are less dependent on access to capital markets. 
Furthermore, the government can benefit from supporting YieldCos that have modest incentive distribution 
right (IDR) agreements; ‘high split’ agreements that can result in up to a 50 percent distribution share for the 
general partner can inhibit a renewable developer’s stable free cash flow generation. 
YieldCos are able to replicate the tax advantages of an MLP due to the nature of the depreciation and tax 
credits generated by the YieldCo structure. Technologies that qualify under the ITC are also eligible to 
depreciate their assets on an accelerated 5-year timetable under the current Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (MACRS). The accelerated depreciation allows renewable technology companies to create accounting 
paper losses, which effectively reduces tax burdens through offsetting future tax credit benefits. Policymakers 
should stress the importance of supporting this depreciation benefit for renewable energy technologies in order 
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to facilitate the formation of the YieldCo structure. In the current renewable energy policy landscape, the 
intersection of government policy objectives and renewable energy development are best met by the significant 
growth opportunity in YieldCos. 
 
9.3 The Widespread Introduction of MLPs to the Renewable Energy Industry 
Although cash grants (Section 1603 Cash Grant) and the pass-through structures (MLPs and YieldCos) 
were both relatively efficient in their use of taxpayer resources, the financial analysis revealed that pass-through 
tax structures are more efficiently able to convert tax expenditures into free cash flow for renewable energy 
developers. Although MLPs are widely considered the gold standard for extracting yield in the energy industry, 
it remains unavailable to the developing renewable industry. The introduction of MLPs (or other pass-through 
tax structures) to renewable energy projects raises concerns regarding the corporate tax base, since MLPs would 
allow such projects to forego corporate-level taxation. In 1987, the “qualifying income” stipulation for MLP 
eligibility was implemented in direct response to concerns about corporate tax base erosion.21 Allowing 
renewable energy companies to structure as MLPs would result in tax revenue losses, but the budget 
implications of the MLP structure should be analyzed relative to the current policy options. According to the 
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), the revenue impact of the MLPPA would be just $307 million over 5 years; 
over the same period, the JCT estimates that tax credit support for renewable energy projects will result in $12.6 
billion in tax revenue losses.22 The JCT forecast alleviates concerns regarding MLPs’ ability to erode the 
corporate tax base and may boost support for the MLPPA. From the government perspective, MLPs can serve 
as a cost effective policy solution for driving renewable energy growth. 
 Typically, MLPs have been used to finance proven technologies with stable cash flows. From the private 
investor perspective, critics of the MLPPA contest that a renewable energy company’s cash flows are too 
volatile for the MLP structure, whose valuation relies on stable, quarterly distributions.18 However, as the 
technology and broader renewable industry continue to mature and earn the trust of more risk-averse investors, 
like investment banks and corporations, renewable energy investments may rapidly increase. Once a renewable 
energy asset is operating efficiently, it immediately begins to generate returns for investors. The MLP structure 
would be a viable option for securing additional capital for renewable projects with long-term power purchase 
agreements. Such projects would fit the MLP structure in a similar manner to a midstream pipeline with long-
term fee-based contracts.  
 From the renewable industry perspective, it is clear that the pass-through structure can drive renewable 
energy growth by lowering the cost of capital and facilitating access to a greater investment base. Regardless of 
the MLPPA, renewable energy companies will continue to create YieldCo entities. The government’s interests 
are aligned with renewable energy companies in this instance, since taxpayer resources most effectively achieve 
policy objectives through the pass-through structure, as shown in the financial model. Under the current policy 
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landscape (in the absence of the MLPPA), renewable energy companies are well positioned to capitalize on the 
government tax expenditures being allocated to the renewable energy industry through the formation of 
YieldCos.  
 
 
 
 
The optimal policy solution for driving renewable energy growth is the pass-through tax structure 
due to its ability to efficiently convert taxpayer resources into free cash flow, while lowering costs of 
capital and offering access to an alternative investor base with a competitive source of capital. 
Policymakers can help drive renewable energy growth by encouraging pass-through structures, either 
through supporting the YieldCo business structure or through the widespread introduction of MLPs to 
the renewable energy industry.  
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 ($ in millions) Base Case Cash Grant Tax Credit
Net Present Value (NPV) of 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 326.0        365.9         345.7          374.5           
8% Discount Rate
ΔNPV of FCF Relative to 
Base Case -           39.9          19.7           48.4            
% Growth 12% 6% 15%
Weighted Average Cost of 
Debt and Tax Equity 5.0% 5.0% 6.4% 4.0%
Net Present Value (NPV) of 
Tax Revenue Loss -              44.6          44.6           38.7            
3% Discount Rate
ΔNPV of Tax Revenue 
Loss Relative to Base Case -              44.6          44.6           38.7            
a
Effective Tax Rate (35%) (35%) (35%) 0%
Tax Credit Benefit
As a % of Capital Expenditures
Δ(Base) NPV of FCF / Δ(Base) 
NPV of Tax Revenue Loss
Key Findings
A measure of the cash flow 
benefit to the company 
relative to the tax revenue 
loss for the government
-              89% 44% 125%
-              -                 
30% of 
expenditures 
until 2016, 10% 
thereafter
30% of 
expenditures until 
2016, 10% 
thereafter
Pass-Through 
Tax Status
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Total Debt / EBITDA
0.0x 1.0x 2.0x 3.0x 4.0x
3.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0%
4.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0%
5.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0%
6.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0%
7.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0%
Interest Rate
Cash Grant Sensitivity 
Total Debt / EBITDA
0.0x 1.0x 2.0x 3.0x 4.0x
-2.0% 88.0% 125.0% 162.0% 199.0% 237.0%
-1.0% 88.0% 106.0% 125.0% 144.0% 162.0%
0.0% 88.0% 88.0% 88.0% 88.0% 88.0%
+1.0% 88.0% 69.0% 51.0% 32.0% 13.0%
+2.0% 88.0% 51.0% 13.0% -24.0% -61.0%
Interest Rate Spread 
(Pass-Through - 5.0% 
Base Case)
Pass-Through Sensitivity 
Tax Equity / (Tax Equity + Total Debt)
00.0% 25.0% 50.0% 70.0% 80.0% 100.0%
-2.0% 89.0% 105.0% 122.0% 135.0% 141.0% 154.0%
-1.0% 89.0% 97.0% 105.0% 112.0% 115.0% 122.0%
0.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0% 89.0%
+1.0% 89.0% 81.0% 73.0% 67.0% 64.0% 57.0%
+2.0% 89.0% 73.0% 57.0% 44.0% 38.0% 25.0%
+3.0% 89.0% 65.0% 41.0% 22.0% 12.0% -7.0%
Interest Rate Spread 
(Tax Equity - 5.0% Base 
Case Traditional Debt 
Financing)
Tax Equity Sensitivity 
Free Cash Flow Discount Rate (Solar Company)
Cash Grant Tax Credit Pass-Through Cash Grant Tax Credit Pass-Through Cash Grant Tax Credit Pass-Through Cash Grant Tax Credit Pass-Through Cash Grant Tax Credit Pass-Through
1.0% 89% 44% 125% 87% 43% 121% 85% 42% 118% 83% 41% 116% 82% 41% 113%
2.0% 91% 45% 128% 89% 44% 125% 87% 43% 122% 85% 42% 119% 84% 42% 116%
3.0% 93% 46% 132% 91% 45% 128% 89% 44% 125% 87% 43% 122% 86% 43% 119%
4.0% 96% 47% 135% 93% 46% 132% 91% 45% 128% 89% 44% 125% 88% 44% 122%
5.0% 98% 48% 139% 96% 47% 135% 94% 46% 132% 92% 45% 129% 90% 45% 125%
10.0%
Tax Revenue Loss 
Discount Rate 
(Government)
6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0%
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Master Limited Partnerships Comparable Companies Analysis ($ in millions)
    LTM 6/30/14 EV Total Debt EV/Debt Cash EBITDA Debt/EBITDA Revenue Gross Profit Operating Income ∆ Working Capital Cash Int. Expense Capex
                                   (EPD) 90,459        18,363        4.9x 242          4,729         3.9x 50,625        3,655         3,460              (44)                 (782)               (3,147)             
                                  (WPZ) 33,765        11,797        2.9x 716          2,177         5.4x 6,511         1,777         1,379              (11)                 (366)               (3,281)             
                                  (ETP) 47,279        17,566        2.7x 1,120       3,543         5.0x 49,195        2,923         2,488              (0)                   (903)               (3,144)             
                                  (KMP) 65,162        21,769        3.0x 268 5,544         3.9x 14,633        4,414         3,926              (146)               (854)               (3,218)             
                                 (ACMP) 16,588        3,805         4.4x 37           667            5.7x 1,159         462            334                 (46)                 (40)                 (1,034)             
    Average 50,651        14,660        3.6x 477          3,332         4.8x 24,425        2,646         2,317              (49)                 (589)               (2,765)             
Source: Bloomberg. Figures represent Last Twelve Months as of June 30, 2014.
Solar Comparable Companies Analysis ($ in millions)
    LTM 6/30/14          EV Total Debt    EV/Debt Cash EBITDA Debt/EBITDA Revenue Gross Profit Operating Income Pre-Tax Income ∆ Working Capital Cash Int. Expense Capex
                                (SCTY) 5,876         840            7.0x 405          (179)           -4.7x 221            65              (225)               (177)               126                 (10)                 (10)            
                                (FSLR) 4,499         195            23.1x 1,349       651            0.3x 3,529         883            409                 378                 187                 (10)                 (225)           
                               (CSIQ) 2,503         1,176         2.1x 341          212            5.6x 2,101         388            195                 56                  (485)               (65)                 (23)            
                               (SPWR) 4,331         1,110         3.9x 988          330            3.4x 2,496         581            231                 42                  (14)                 (46)                 (35)            
                               (VSLR) 1,692         141            12.0x 25           292            0.5x 483            355            (53)                 (125)               N/A N/A (9)              
    Average 3,780         692            9.6x 622          261            1.0x 1,766         454            111                 35                  (47)                 (33)                 (60)            
Source: Bloomberg, figures represent last twelve months as of June 30, 2014
LTM 6/30/14 Gross Margin EBITDA Margin EV/ EBITDA Pre-Tax Margin ΔWC as a Capex as a Int. Expense / Cash / EV
(Gross Profit / Revenue) (EBITDA / Revenue) (Pre-Tax Income / EBITDA) % of Revenue % of Revenue Total Debt
Rounded Average 25.0% 15.0% 14.5x 13.5% 2.5% 3.5% 5.0% 16.0%
Financial Model Assumptions Derived From Solar Comparable Companies Analysis
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MLP Distribution Growth Matrix
100% Retained 
DCF
40% Debt / 60% 
Retained DCF
40% Debt / 60% 
Common Units
($US in Millions, Unless Noted $/Unit Below)
General Assumptions
Incremental Capital Deployed (New Investment) 1,461.0$             1,733.0$             2,603.7$             
Assumed Unlevered Return on Capital 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%
Financing Assumptions
Retained Distributable Cash Flow (DCF) 1,461.0$         1,039.8$         -$              
New Equity -                  -                  1,562.2          
# of LP Units Issued to Fund Investment -                  -                  24.8
New Debt -                  693.2 1,041.5          
Reference MLP Unit Price $66.50 $66.50 $66.50
Current 10-yr. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (40% Debt / 60% Equity) N/A 3.93% 5.08%
Distributable Cash Flow
Assumed Expected Cash Flow from New Investment 146.1 173.3 260.37
Less: Interest Expense Associated with New Debt Issued (27.2)             (40.9)             
Distributable Cash Flow 146.1            146.1            219.5            
Less: Distributions Attributed to New Units Issued -                  -                  (69.4)             
Incremental DCF Available for All Units 146.1            146.1            150.1            
Existing # of Distribution Bearing LP Units 913.1 913.1 913.1
New LP Units Issued -                  -                  24.8
Total Distribution Bearing LP Units 913.1 913.1 937.9
Distribution Increase per LP Unit from New Investment $0.16 $0.16 $0.16
Current Annualized Distribution $2.80 $2.80 $2.80
% Increase 5.70% 5.70% 5.70%
Source: Enterprise Products Partners L.P. Analyst Conference Presentation (2014)
Source of Capital 
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 Source: NAPTP, Market Capital as of 9/30/13
Oil and Gas 
Midstream 
71% 
Investment/
Financial 
10% 
Oil and Gas 
E&P 
5% 
Oil and Gas 
Downstream 
3% 
Marine 
Transportation 
2% 
Propane 
2.19% 
Coal 
2% 
Other Minerals, 
Timber  
2% 
Real Estate 
Properties 
0.33% 
Other 
3% 
MLP Market Capitalization by Sector 
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YieldCo Comparable Companies Analysis 
$ in millions Abengoa NextEra Energy Partners NRG Energy Pattern Energy SunEdison (TerraForm)
Current Generation Capacity (MW) 1,010 990 3,047 1,434 525
Right of First Offer (ROFO) Generation (MW) 1,521 1,550 469 441 935
ROFO Transmission (Miles) 5,875 - - - -
ROFO Water Infrastructure (M ft^3 / day) 19 - - - -
Additional Sponsor Qualifying Generation (MW) ND 11,460 1,600 - -
Regions US/LatAm/Spain US/Canada US US/Canada/LatAm US/Canada/LatAm
Asset Types (Currently as of July 2014) Generation/Trans. Solar/Wind Generation Wind Solar
General Partner No Yes No No Yes
2015 Yield Estimate (%) 3.2% 2.2% 3.3% 4.8% 3.5%
2016 Yield Estimate (%) 4.9% 2.7% 3.9% 5.6% 4.8%
Target Annual Growt (%) 10-12% 12-15% 15-18% 10-12% 15
Growth (Years) - w/ ROFO + Additional Assets 7 15 6 2 3
Market Cap (Public + Private) $3,225 $3,348 $3,340 $2,100 $1,002
Public Ownership (%) 31% 19% 34% 65% 23%
Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research Estimates
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NRG Yield, Inc. Financials ($ in millions) FY 2012 FY 2013 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2014E FY 2014E FY 2015E
Income Summary 12/31/12 12/31/13 3/31/14 6/30/14 9/30/14 12/31/14 12/31/14 12/31/15
Segment Revenues
Conventional -              82           28           61           65           
Renewables 33           79           17           30           48           
Thermal 142          152          65           43           48           
Corporate -              -              -              -              -              
Total Revenues 175          313          110          134          161          158          683          1,040          
% Growth 78.9% 118.2% 52.2%
COGS (112)         (127)         (53)           (45)           (52)           
Gross Profit 63           186          57           89           109          
Gross Margin 36.0% 59.4% 51.8% 66.4% 67.7%
Change (bps) 2342 bps
SG&A (7)            (7)            (2)            (2)            (3)            
D&A (25)           (51)           (17)           (36)           (34)           
Operating Income 31           128          38           51           70           
Other Income (Expenses) (8)            (11)           (17)           (15)           (29)           
EBIT 23           117          21           36           41           
Adj. EBITDA 99           244          69           109          140          137          455          585            
Adj. EBITDA Margin 56.6% 78.0% 62.7% 81.3% 87.0% 86.7% 66.6% 56.3%
Change (bps) 2138 bps
Cash Flow Summary 
Adj. EBITDA 99           244          69           109          140          137          455          585################
Cash Interest Expense (17)           (55)           (19)           (29)           (40)           (43)           (131)         (203)           
Cash Tax Provision -              -              -              -              -              -              -              -                
Working Capital 6             (3)            (25)           (25)           16           19           (15)           (15)             
Other (30)           (45)           (9)            2             5             -              (30)           (35)             
Cash from Operations 58           141          16           57           121          113          293          470            
Maintenance Capital Expenditures (5)            (8)            (3)            (4)            (3)            (7)            (17)           (18)             
Other Items (26)           (42)           11            (15)           (24)           (117)         (131)         (292)           
Cash Available for Distribution (CAFD) 27           91           24           38           94           (11)           145          160            
CAFD Conversion as a % of EBITDA 27.3% 37.3% 34.8% 34.9% 67.1% -8.0% 31.9% 27.4%
Change (bps) 1002 bps
Adj. EBITDA - Maintenance Capex 94           236          66           105          137          130          438          567            
Balance Sheet Summary 
Cash and Equivalents 22           36           420          87           372          350          350          320            
Senior Notes -              -              -              -              500          500          500          500            
Project-Level Debt 781          1,133        1,058        1,675        3,258        3,258        3,258        3,400          
Total Debt 807          1,133        1,381        1,999        4,083        4,083        4,083        4,225          
Total Assets 1,964        2,313        2,534        3,236        5,899        5,950        5,950        6,250          
Enterprise Value (17.0x) 1,683        4,148        4,692        6,052        7,106        7,735        7,735        9,945          
Credit Statistics
Senior Debt / EBITDA 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 3.6x 3.6x 1.1x 0.9x
Total Debt / EBITDA 8.2x 4.6x 20.0x 18.3x 29.2x 29.8x 9.0x 7.2x
EV / EBITDA 17.0x 17.0x 68.0x 55.5x 50.8x 56.5x 17.0x 17.0x
EV / Senior Debt -              -              -              -              -              -              -              -                
EV / Total Debt 2.1x 3.7x 3.4x 3.0x 1.7x 1.9x 1.9x 2.4x
EBITDA / Interest 5.8x 4.4x 3.6x 3.8x 3.5x 3.2x 3.5x 2.9x
(EBITDA - Capex) / Interest 5.5x 4.3x 3.5x 3.6x 3.4x 3.0x 3.3x 2.8x
CAFD / Senior Debt -              -              -              -              -              -              -              -                
CAFD / Total Debt 3.3% 8.0% 1.7% 1.9% 2.3% -0.3% 3.6% 3.8%
Operating Metrics
Renewable MWh sold (in millions) 464          963          227          404          497          
Thermal MWht sold (in thousands) 1,517        1,679        667          493          532          
Source: NRG Yield Company Data and SEC Filings
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 Eligible solar, fuel cell and small wind projects receive a tax credit 
equal to 30% of  total expenditures
 The ITC is expected to drop down to 10% in 2017
 During the program's tenure from 2009 - 2011, the grant offered
eligible developers with a cash injection equal to 30% of  a project's
total cost basis in place of  the traditional ITC incentive
 A per-kilowatt-hour tax credit granted to qualifying energy
technologies for electricity generation
(e.g. 2.3¢ / kWh for wind)
 In a loan guarantee agreement, the federal government pledges to 
cover the full debt obligation in the event of  a borrow default, which 
materially reduces the borrowing cost for the loan guarantee recipient
 A regulatory mandate to increase energy production from renewable 
energy sources
 Such standards currently only exist at the state level and in select
European nations
Investment Tax 
Credit (ITC)
Section 1603 Cash 
Grant
Production Tax 
Credit (PTC)
Department of  
Energy Loan 
Guarantee Program
Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS)
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Glossary 
 
 
Cost of Capital:  Including both the cost of equity and the cost of the debt, cost of capital is the 
return investors require to ensure that a capital-budgeting project is worthwhile. A 
higher cost of capital implies that a project is relatively riskier, and thus requires a 
higher rate of return compensation for its investors. 
 
 
EBITDA: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA measures 
a company’s profitability and is used to represent a company’s true ability to 
generate cash flow irrespective of tax policy, depreciation strategy, capital 
structure and interest expense (which vary between policy scenarios). 
 
 
General Partner: The general partner (GP) generally retains a 2 percent ownership stake in an MLP 
and manages the daily operations of the business partnership. GPs are eligible to 
receive incentive distributions, which attempt to align GP interests with the 
limited partners.  
 
 
Incentive Distribution   
Rights (IDRs): IDRs are typically held by the general partner, or the associated parent-sponsor 
company, and allows GPs to receive an increasing portion of quarterly 
distributions after reaching target distribution thresholds. As long as the IDR does 
not excessively burden cash flow generation, the IDR structure aligns the interests 
of both the GP and the LP.  
 
 
Limited Partner: The limited partner provides capital to an MLP or pass-through structure, but has 
no role in the operations or management of the business partnership. The LP 
receives cash flow distributions in exchange for its capital contribution.  
 
 
Maintenance Capex: The capital expenditure expenses that a business incurs in order to maintain core 
business operations. This includes, but is not limited to, funds necessary to repair 
or replace fixed assets.  
 
 
Master Limited  
Partnership (MLP): An MLP is a business structure that benefits from avoiding the corporate level 
taxation of a C-corporation, and whose ownership interest units are traded as 
securities in financial markets, like corporate stock. Currently, a partnership must 
derive 90 percent of its income from qualifying sources, including commodities, 
conventional energy sources and other depletable resources. Renewable energy 
technologies are not eligible to register as MLPs.  
 
 
Yield Company (YieldCo): Like MLPs, YieldCos also house assets that generate power under long-term 
purchase agreements and distribute much of their cash flow to shareholders. The 
rise of the YieldCo has further validated the pass-through structure and has 
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incentivized developers to create publicly traded yield-oriented investment 
vehicles by offering exposure to an alternative investor pool with a more 
competitive source of equity capital. The current tax depreciation system enables 
renewable developers to use an accelerated 5-year depreciation timetable; 
therefore, YieldCos can report accounting losses, ultimately replicating the tax 
benefits of an MLP structure through offsetting future tax credits.  
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